


Confidential Verifiable Transactions - 2 $PP = (p, g)$.



$$Enc(a, i_1, n_1) = c_{1a} = (E_{1a}, D_{1a}) = (n_1 \cdot a^{i_1}, g^{i_1}) \bmod p$$

$$Enc(a, i_2, n_2) = c_{2a} = (E_{2a}, D_{2a}) = (n_2 \cdot a^{i_2}, g^{i_2}) \bmod p$$

$$c_{1a} \cdot c_{2a} = c_{12a} = Enc(a, i_{12}, n_{12}) = (E_{12a}, D_{12a}) = (n_{12} \cdot a^{i_{12}}, g^{i_{12}}) = c_{12a}$$

$$i_{12} = (i_1 + i_2) \bmod (p-1)$$

$$n_{12} = n_1 \cdot n_2 \bmod p$$

$$c_{3\beta} \cdot c_{4\beta} = c_{34\beta} = Enc(\beta, i_{34}, n_{34}) = (E_{34\beta}, D_{34\beta}) = (n_{34} \cdot \beta^{i_{34}}, g^{i_{34}}) = c_{34\beta}$$

$$i_{34} = (i_3 + i_4) \bmod (p-1)$$

$$n_{34} = n_3 \cdot n_4 \bmod p$$

If transaction balance is valid: $m_1 + m_2 = 2000 + 3000 = 1000 + 4000 = m_3 + m_4$

then since:

$$n_{12} = n_1 \cdot n_2 = g^{m_1} \cdot g^{m_2} \bmod p = g^{m_1 + m_2} \bmod p$$

$$n_{34} = n_3 \cdot n_4 = g^{m_3} \cdot g^{m_4} \bmod p = g^{m_3 + m_4} \bmod p$$

$n_{12} = n_{34} = n$

\mathcal{P} : must prove to the net, that c_{12a} and $c_{34\beta}$ encrypted the same value $n_{12} = n_{34} = n$; \longrightarrow Ciphertexts Equivalency Proof.

The statement st for this proof is the following:

$$st = \{c_{12a}, c_{34\beta}, a, \beta\}; \text{ For example: } a = g^x \bmod p$$

$\text{PuK} = a$ is a statement for x .

For proof A randomly generates integers u, v and $(-v) \bmod (p-1)$

$$u \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathbb{Z}_{p-1}); \mathbb{Z}_{p-1} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, p-2\}$$

$$v \leftarrow \text{randi}(\mathbb{Z}_{p-1})$$

$$-v \bmod (p-1) \longrightarrow \Rightarrow m\bar{v} = \text{mod}(-v, p-1)$$

1. The following commitments $\{t_1, t_2, t_3\}$ are computed:

$$t_1 = g^u \bmod p$$

$$t_2 = g^v \bmod p$$

$$t_3 = (D_{12}a)^u \cdot \beta^{-v} \bmod p$$

2. The following h -value is computed using secure h -function H :

$$h = H(a \parallel \beta \parallel t_1 \parallel t_2 \parallel t_3)$$

3. A having her $\text{PrK} x$ and $i_{34} = (i_3 + i_4) \bmod (p-1)$ computes r and s

$$r = (x \cdot h + u) \bmod (p-1)$$

$$s = (i_{34} \cdot h + v) \bmod (p-1)$$

and declares the following set of data to the Net

$$\{c_{1a}, c_{2a}, c_{3\beta}, c_{4\beta}\} \cup \{a, \beta, t_1, t_2, t_3, r, s\} \longrightarrow \text{Net}$$

Net computes h -value defined above

$$h = H(a \parallel \beta \parallel t_1 \parallel t_2 \parallel t_3)$$

Net verifies transaction correctness by verifying the following identities

$$g^r = a^h \cdot t_1 \bmod p$$

$$g^s = (D_{34}\beta)^h \cdot t_2 \bmod p$$

$$(E_{34}\beta)^h \cdot (E_{12}a)^{-h} \cdot (D_{12}a)^r \cdot \beta^{-s} = t_3 \bmod p$$

Declare Public Parameters to the network $\text{PP} = (p, g);$

$p = 268435019; g = 2;$

$\text{PrK}_A = x \leftarrow \text{randi} \implies \text{PuK}_A = a = g^x \bmod p$

$\text{PrK}_A = x \leftarrow \text{randi} \implies \text{PuK}_A = a = g^x \bmod p$

```
>> p=int64(268435019)
p = 268435019
>> g=2;
```

```
>> x=int64(randi(p-1))
x = int64(220099152)
>> a=mod_exp(g,x,p)
a = 174059961
```

```
>> z=int64(randi(p-1))
z = int64(49750938)
>> beta=mod_exp(g,z,p)
beta = int64(213338364)
```

Incomes

```
>> m1=2000;
>> n1=mod_exp(g,m1,p)
n1 = 28125784
>> i1=int64(randi(p-1))
i1 = int64(207414820)
>> a_i1=mod_exp(a,i1,p)
a_i1 = 192148999
>> E1a=mod(n1*a_i1,p)
E1a = 207347548
>> D1a=mod_exp(g,i1,p)
D1a = 202537833
```

```
>> m2=3000;
>> n2=mod_exp(g,m2,p)
n2 = 222979214
>> i2=int64(randi(p-1))
i2 = int64(67446699)
>> a_i2=mod_exp(a,i2,p)
a_i2 = 211790072
>> E2a=mod(n2*a_i2,p)
E2a = 77938423
>> D2a=mod_exp(g,i2,p)
D2a = 82080815
```

```
>> E12a=mod(E1a*E2a,p)
E12a = 52532683
>> D12a=mod(D1a*D2a,p)
D12a = 32918394
```

C12a = (E12a, D12a)

c1a = (E1a, D1a)

C2a = (E2a, D2a)

Verification: Dec(x, c1a) = nn1

```
>> mx=mod(-x,p-1)
mx = 48335866
>> D1a_mx=mod_exp(D1a,mx,p)
D1a_mx = 75547583
>> nn1=mod(E1a*D1a_mx,p)
nn1 = 28125784
```

Verification: Dec(x, c2a) = nn2

```
>> mx=mod(-x,p-1)
mx = 48335866
>> D2a_mx=mod_exp(D2a,mx,p)
D2a_mx = 57701660
>> nn2=mod(E2a*D2a_mx,p)
nn2 = 222979214
```

Expenses

```
>> m3=1000;
>> n3=mod_exp(g,m3,p)
n3 = 260099963
>> i3=int64(randi(p-1))
i3 = int64(137379932)
>> beta_i3=mod_exp(beta,i3,p)
beta_i3 = 14259017
>> E3beta=mod(n3*beta_i3,p)
E3beta = 167897317
>> D3beta=mod_exp(g,i3,p)
D3beta = 65145889
```

```
>> m4=4000;
>> n4=mod_exp(g,m4,p)
n4 = 246637967
>> i4 = int64(randi(p-1))
i4 = int64(225960178)
>> beta_i4=mod_exp(beta,i4,p)
beta_i4 = 159771180
>> E4beta=mod(n4*beta_i4,p)
E4beta = 195130083
>> D4beta=mod_exp(g,i4,p)
D4beta = 229603826
```

```
>> E34beta=mod(E3beta*E4beta,p)
E34beta = 57420210
>> D34beta=mod(D3beta*D4beta,p)
D34beta = 107062668
```

C34beta = (E34beta, D34beta)

Verification: Dec(z, c3beta) = nn3

```
>> mz=mod(-z,p-1)
mz = 218684080
>> D3beta_mz=mod_exp(D3beta,mz,p)
D3beta_mz = 258869169
>> nn3=mod(E3beta*D3beta_mz,p)
nn3 = 260099963
```

Verification: Dec(z, c3beta) = nn3

```
>> mz=mod(-z,p-1)
mz = 218684080
>> D4beta_mz=mod_exp(D4beta,mz,p)
D4beta_mz = 218460911
>> nn4=mod(E4beta*D4beta_mz,p)
nn4 = 246637967
```

The modification of the existing NIZKP to prove the equivalency of two cophertexts.

Namely c_{12a} and Ca,I in (18), (19), and $C\beta,E$ in (20), (21). Recall that Ca,I is a ciphertext of plaintext I encryption with Alice's $\text{PuK}=a$ and $C\beta,E$ is a ciphertext of plaintext E encryption with the AA's $\text{PuK}=\beta$. The statement St of our proposed NIZKP consists of the following:

$$St = \{(\epsilon_{a,I}, \delta_{a,I}), (\epsilon_{\beta,E}, \delta_{\beta,E}), a, \beta\}. \quad (22)$$

The random integers $u \leftarrow \text{randi}(Z_q)$ and $v \leftarrow \text{randi}(Z_q)$ are generated by Alice, and the value $(-v) \bmod q$ is computed. The proof of ciphertext equivalence is computed using three computation steps:

1. The following commitments are computed:

$$t_1 = g^u \bmod p; \quad (23)$$

$$t_2 = g^v \bmod p; \quad (24)$$

$$t_3 = (\delta_{a,I})^u \cdot \beta^{-v} \bmod p. \quad (25)$$

2. The following h -value is computed using the cryptographically secure h -function H :

$$h = H(a \parallel \beta \parallel t_1 \parallel t_2 \parallel t_3). \quad (26)$$

3. Alice, having her $\text{PrK}_A=x$ randomly generates the secret number l for E encryption and computes the following two values:

$$r = x \cdot h + u \bmod q; \quad (27)$$

$$s = l \cdot h + v \bmod q. \quad (28)$$

Then Alice declares the following set of data to the Net:

$$\{a, \beta, t_1, t_2, t_3, r, s\} \rightarrow \text{Net}. \quad (29)$$

To verify the transaction's validity, the Net computes the h -value according to (26) and then verifies three identities:

$$g^r = a^h \cdot t_1; \quad (30)$$

$$g^s = (\delta_{\beta,E})^h \cdot t_2; \quad (31)$$

$$(\epsilon_{\beta,E})^h \cdot (\epsilon_{a,I})^{-h} \cdot (\delta_{a,I})^r \cdot \beta^{-s} = t_3. \quad (32)$$

To verify the transaction's validity, the Net computes the h -value according to (26) and then verifies three identities:

$$g^r = a^h \cdot t_1; \quad (30)$$

$$g^s = (\delta_{\beta,E})^h \cdot t_2; \quad (31)$$

$$(\epsilon_{\beta,E})^h \cdot (\epsilon_{a,I})^{-h} \cdot (\delta_{a,I})^r \cdot \beta^{-s} = t_3. \quad (32)$$